1.

Introduction
In the intensifying debate about the prospects for a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the notion of strategic culture is increasingly invoked as shorthand to highlight that national security and defence policies rest on deep-seated norms, beliefs and ideas about the appropriate use of force (Martinsen 2004 , Heiselberg 2003 , Rynning 2003 , Longhurst and Zaborowski 2005 . While some authors argue that the differences among national strategic cultures in Europe are large and persistent (Rynning 2003 , Lindley-French 2002 , others point out dynamics, which may lead to a process of convergence towards a European strategic culture (Howorth 2002, Cornish and Edwards 2001) . This debate has not been decided yet, because of a lack of direct empirical evidence about cultural change but also because of unresolved questions regarding the use of strategic culture in applied research. The leading theoretical literature on strategic culture (Gray 1999a , Gray 1999b , Johnston 1995 , Johnston 1999 ) is of limited utility, because it fails to sufficiently disaggregate the notion of strategic culture and provides little guidance on how to empirically analyse strategic culture in a contemporary context. The paper makes the case for distinguishing four types of strategic norms as interrelated components of a broader strategic culture, which shapes corridors of normal behaviour and illuminates key motives for strategic choice. It argues that some of these norms may be less resistant to change and more widely shared across territorially bounded security communities than commonly assumed. Focusing on the case of Europe after the end of the cold war, the paper argues that all four of these strategic norms are subject to three distinct mechanisms of social learning affecting national elites and societies in varying ways. The paper puts forward a number of hypotheses about the direction of this change and identifies areas of strong convergence, particularly with respect to international authorisation, preferred mode of cooperation and goals for the use of force. This study cannot provide definitive empirical answers, but makes the case for testing the learning mechanisms and their effects through transnational collaboration on a comparative research design.
2.
The European Strategic Culture Debate
Member states of the European Union (EU) adopted in 2003 the first ever European Security Strategy (ESS). It sets out an analysis of and response to the most salient security threats the Union is facing (European Council 2003) , even if some ambiguities and gaps remain (Heisbourg 2004) . The intangible of 'European strategic culture' has been introduced into the debate to highlight that the successful implementation of the ESS will depend not just on the creation of the requisite military and civil capabilities, but also on a sufficiently shared pool of norms, beliefs and ideas regarding the means and ends of defence policy. The ESS itself calls for the development of 'a strategic culture, which fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention' (European Council 2003, p. 12) . European strategic culture in this rudimentary form is depicted as a kind of common mindset to allow the successful implementation of certain types of ESDP actions. Cornish and Edwards define it 'as the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments, together with general recognition of the EU's legitimacy as an international actor with military capabilities' (Cornish and Edwards 2001, p. 587) . This is not to downplay the centrality of member states' policy choices and their implementation for the performance of ESDP given that each member has a veto under the decision-making rules and considering that any military mission of the EU will have to rely on national military contingents. These national policy choices are shaped by collective strategic cultures, which are themselves the results of long and diverse historical experiences. This does not mean that all kinds of divergence between national and European strategic cultures are harmful for the evolution of ESDP given that the EU is in many respects a different political entity than any of its component parts. Nevertheless, under the current voting rules a successful European strategic culture would need to capture and draw upon similar norms, ideas and practices regarding security and defence policy and the legitimate use of force. This would require a substantial degree of convergence in national strategic norms so that a common platform for action can be found.
Normative convergence can have many faces. We could see, for instance, a trend towards a limited pacific or only self-defence oriented European strategic culture, which would mean that authorisation is protracted, highly dependent on the support of other non-EU countries and the UN, as well as limited to certain types of situations and conflicts. Conversely, we could envisage convergence as the gradual transformation or upgrading of particularly the more pacific or defensive-minded countries towards more activism in the pursuit of their goals, which would entail an expansion of the legitimate ends of ESDP coupled with an increasing lowering of the norms regarding the international legitimisation and domestic authorisation of the use of military force. Finally, convergence may be conceived of as a process that affects all strategic cultures and pushes them towards a kind of median or hybrid set of norms, which are then becoming increasingly institutionalised and internalised. In the current academic discussion (Freedman 2004, pp. 22-23) as well as in the Solana report (European Council 2003) , convergence is implicitly conceived of in the sense of upgrading towards 'a more active' strategic culture presented by countries such as France and the UK, which form an attractive core or 'model' of robust strategic cultures for others to follow or at least not to oppose (Everts et al. 2004 ). The question is whether national strategic cultures are converging towards a greater activism in the pursuit of security and value goals, a higher preparedness to use coercive means and accept risks, lower thresholds for the authorisation of force, and a higher acceptance of the European Union as the legitimate vehicle for conduct of defence policies (see below for typology of norms). This would not exclude the possibility that governments' can disagree over the relative priority of threats (Kirchner and Sperling 2002) or lack the political will to act for overriding domestic reasons, including the ability to finance military operations (Keukeleire 2002) .
What is the empirical evidence that convergence of strategic cultures is actually taking place?
On the one side of the debate are those who highlight important EU decisions on institutions, policies and capabilities and argue that they are in fact based on growing ideational and cognitive homogeneity (Howorth, 2002; Cornish & Edwards, 2001 ). On the other side are those who maintain that Europeans still disagree over key issues concerning the analysis of threats and the application of military force, raising the risk that the EU will fail to act effectively when faced with grave threats or crisis (Lindley-French, 2002; Rynning, 2003) . A particular strand of the more sceptical position is the edited volume by Longhurst and Zaborowski (2005) , which focuses on persistent differences in national strategic cultures to explain the 'Old Europe -New Europe divide' over Iraq. However, both sides of the debate exhibit a certain tendency to treat ideas and norms as self-evident or easily deducible from the behaviour and policies of governments within the EU; instead, they should be studied empirically at the level of both national elites and public on the basis of a unified comparative research design. This has not been done so far with the exception of some smaller studies. Heiselberg (2003) for example investigated the impact of the Kosovo war as a 'formative moment' on the narratives underpinning national strategic cultures in the UK, Sweden and Germany. Howorth has explored how coordinative and communicative discourses may be relevant to understanding the changes in the ideas underpinning ESDP (Howorth 2004) . In another work, he has pointed to a number of powerful 'endogenous and exogenous historical forces ' (2003, p. 9) , most notably the aspirations of Europeans to accomplish political union and the increasing unwillingness of the US to foot the bill for European security free-riding after the end of the cold war. While such an account has its merits when written by an expert with profound knowledge of the policy area and its evolution, it leaves room for a more rigorous theoretical approach to explaining the key dynamics at play and probe them empirically with an appropriate methodology.
3.
Conceptualising and Unpacking Strategic Culture(s)
The intensifying debate about prospects for the emergence of a European strategic culture lacks cohesion because the core concept is contested in the broader theoretical literature. The key point of contention among so-called first and third generation theorists of strategic culture is whether their referent object of study should be used to try 'to understand' (Gray 1999b) or 'to explain' (Johnston 1995 ) the strategic behaviour of states' in security and defence affairs.
Alastair Iain Johnston sees strategic culture as a potentially important independent variable for explaining behaviour, 'as an ideational milieu which limits behavioral choices' (Johnston 1995, p. 46) . He argues from a Popperian understanding of social science that theories positing the influence of strategic culture on actions should be 'falsifiable, or at least distinguishable from non-strategic culture variables' (ibid. p. 45) so that their comparative advantage to other theories of strategic choice, such as neorealism, can be ascertained (Glenn et al. 2004) . To include behaviour in the definition of strategic culture as Colin Gray does, would in Johnston's view overly inflate the notion and thereby deprive it of its explanatory value. Gray in contrast, conceptualises 'culture as context', which comprises and pervades behaviour of political actors, thus 'going all the way down' (Gray 1999a , Gray 1999b ). He criticises Johnston's approach for artificially separating what is part of a coherent whole and emphasises that culture is not a causal variable to be used for prediction, but a context that helps us to understand the reasons and motivations of actors.
I follow Gray in so far as ideas, beliefs and norms are not like independent variables used by neorealist theories such as the distribution of power capabilities. Actors do not start with a blank sheet of mind, when they are faced with a problem or an opportunity to act, but draw on pre-existing and usually stable schemata, beliefs and ideas about the external world and deeply ingrained norms about appropriate behaviour (Checkel 2000 , Olsen 2000 . They cannot extract themselves and their potential utilitarian considerations from the cultural and social context in which they are embedded and their actions will always reflect this context.
Johnston in his reply to Gray (Johnston 1999 ) effectively acknowledges the weakness of an overly atomistic approach in his earlier writing.
Yet, this does not mean that an explanation of outcomes is not possible as exponents of modernist constructivism have argued (Adler 2002 , Risse 2000 , Schimmelfennig 2000 , Checkel 1998 , Katzenstein 1996a We can use our findings to map a corridor of 'normal' or 'probable' behaviour of states and integrate them into more comprehensive analyses of strategic choice.
The second major question is how we can use strategic culture in applied research. Most definitions of strategic culture are quite broad and loose in so far as they incorporate references to beliefs, ideas, attitudes, world-views, collective memories, as well as practices, habits, traditions, or patterns of behaviour (Johnston 1995 , Gray 1999a , Martinsen 2004 , Heiselberg 2003 , Longhurst 2004 . Returning briefly to the debate between Gray and
Johnston whether practices or behaviour can belong to such a definition, it would seem to me overly scholastic and nonsensical to re-define the meaning of a commonly used term such as culture in a way that deprives it of a key semantic component. The conceptual disadvantages of a broad definition of strategic culture can be overcome by focusing on specific normative, cognitive or ideational components to realise our modified explanatory aspirations, and to avoid over determining outcomes along the lines of national essentialism ('The Germans cannot but act as Germans'). Having reviewed a number of definitions of strategic culture put forward not only by Gray and Johnston, but also by Martinsen (2003) and Longhurst (2004) Checkel. Secondly, the definition reflects an understanding that norms, ideas and practices are not isolated variables, but should be rather seen as interrelated elements of and derived from an overarching identity narratives of a given community in its relation to the outside world.
Finally, this definition highlights that strategic culture can be quite heterogeneous and contested within societies in just the same way as national identity narratives are. We are thus faced with a majoritarian conception of culture in the sense of a national framework culture, which can be subject to both internal and external forces of contestation and change.
The real problem with the concept of strategic culture is not so much one of definition than one of empirical application. At the aggregate level strategic culture is simply too broad a notion to explain much; it needs to be 'unpacked' into its most important normative, ideational and behavioural components. Given the difficulties of analysing all aspects of strategic culture simultaneously, I suggest to focus on what Katzenstein has called constitutive and regulative norms as the most persistent and most deeply rooted aspects of national strategic cultures. Katzenstein conceptualises norms as social facts, which define standards of appropriate behaviour and express actors' identities (Katzenstein, 1996a, p. 19 ).
Norms in this sense are arguably the least volatile components of strategic culture. They do not change easily in different situations, but are deeply ingrained, identity-derived collective expectations of what is appropriate behaviour. Hence, in order to better describe the normative components of strategic culture, I propose a conceptual framework with four main scalable norms, which can take different values in different national settings (see Table 1 The focus on strategic norms along the scale of activism as suggested by Heiselberg (2003, pp. 12-13) has the added advantage of doing away with the overly rigid dichotomies used in much of the literature on strategic culture. Sten Rynning speaks of a 'strong' and a 'weak'
European strategic culture, where the latter would allow the EU to prevail in zero-sum conflict situations, in which opposing actors need to be defeated rather than persuaded to change their views, interests and behaviour (2003, p. 484 
How Do Strategic Norms Change? Outlining Three Learning Mechanisms
It is true that the scientific appeal of the notion of strategic culture and their underpinning norms is linked to their relative resilience vis-à-vis the forces of history. Kerry Longhurst for instance argues that strategic cultures 'arise gradually over time, through a unique and protracted historical process. Strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its original inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective's experiences' (Longhurst 2004) . One would not be surprised therefore that strategic norms can change over three centuries at a global scale as Martha
Finnemore (2003) argued by focusing on interventions to collect debts, for humanitarian reasons or to safeguard peace and order. But since this study is interested in changes over a shorter time frame and in a smaller part of the world, differences between the strategic cultures of countries are important, and so are the forces that may explain how these cultures change vis-à-vis each other. Generally, cognitive frameworks of a political community in international and security affairs are established through complex socialisation processes, most dramatically in the societal interpretations and identity transformations in the aftermaths of defeats in war as epitomised by the cases of Germany and Japan (Hondrich 1992 , Katzenstein 1996a . The key question is whether we can identify also other mechanisms, events or long-term developments that can alter the underlying norms and ideas in a similar, perhaps more gradual way, than the direct experience of full blown war sweeping the home territory. The following section will set out three learning mechanisms and their impact on one or more of the four types of strategic norms. It will also explore briefly the factors, which may help to explain which European countries are likely to be affected most strongly by these pressures. The three mechanisms may not be powerful enough to change the overarching security narratives or defence identities of a given country in the short term, but they can make them less stable and open new avenues for policy-makers. The theoretical framework has been informed by exploratory empirical research mainly through practitioner interviews and content analysis on four country cases (Britain, Germany, France, and Poland) but will need to be investigated much more extensively by future comparative research and collaboration.
Learning Through Changing Threat Perceptions: The Impact of the Demise and Transformation of the Soviet Union
Early realists saw the lust for power as a basic human condition and a powerful psychological explanation of military strategy (Morgenthau 1948) , whereas later realist thinking focused on fear for one's own survival in a dangerous environment as an even more powerful factor (Waltz 1979) . Stephen M. Walt captured this new emphasis in realist thought when he studied how threat perceptions come about and in doing so ventured into the ideational territory of social constructivism (Walt 1996) . Threat perceptions of a given security community regarding another state, organisation, or social group, can arise from a wide range of different 
Learning Through Institutions: Socialising Effects of ESDP structures and committees
The second learning mechanism arises from the ability of institutions and decision-shaping structures created at the supranational level to affect the norms held by delegated national officials through processes of social influence. Experiments in the field of social psychology have shown that groups, whether strongly institutionalised or ad-hoc, are in principle able to shift individual cognitions, feelings, and behaviour (Avermaet 2001 , Pennington et al. 1999 , Smith and Mackie 2000 . Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) established that individuals experience physiologically measurable stress when they discover that their attitudes, ideas and beliefs are inconsistent with what they perceive as the dominant norms of the group and will often take steps to resolve this inconsistency by changing their attitudes and perceptions. This process is called normative influence. Alternatively, individuals may change their views because they believe or are persuaded that the group's dominant norms better reflect reality or are more appropriate, which is usually referred to as informational influence.
Theorists of regional integration have drawn on, adapted and applied these insights to argue that the participation of national civil servants in EU institutions and committees can set in motion socialisation dynamics, which can overcome gaps in mutual trust and world views among national representative, thereby weakening the ideational influence of their ministries in the capitals. Neo-functionalist have called this process 'actor socialisation', 'cultivated spill-over', 'engrenage', or 'cognitive Europeanization' (Schmitter 2003 , Lindberg 1971 284, Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, p. 119) . They focus primarily on the impact of the numerous EU level committees, task forces and working groups, which are woven together by complex systems of consultation, coordination and information exchange. Europeanising social influence increases with intensity and length of exposure and varies across different types of committees as well as between policy fields (Trondal and Veggeland 2000, Hooghe 1998 ). We would expect to find strong social influence within committees and institutions, which meet frequently and extensively, whose members are based in Brussels and/or are delegated permanently, which are put in charge of new policy initiatives and where group size, shared professional background and confidentiality allow for intimate discussions (cf.
Checkel 2000).
The new European structures for decision-making in the field of security and defence meet many of these criteria for normative and informational influence and are considered capable to bring about a convergence in strategic thinking (Howorth 2002 It was prepared within a small circle of high civil servants around Solana with some input from the PSC, discussed with external experts at three seminars, and finalised by the PSC in the formation of Political Directors. ESDP structures and actors had therefore had a key impact on the formulation of a document, which represents a substantial shift away from the 'civil power' leitbild towards a Union that aims to develop autonomy in defence matters and considers the use of military force a legitimate option to tackle security threats. The ESS represents a departure in strategic thinking for the NATO oriented countries, who had previously resisted giving the EU a strong role in security and defence (the UK), as well as for those pacific and self-defence minded countries (Germany, Austria, Sweden), who had difficulties in signing up to a more activist use of force for the purpose of counteracting threats and defending human rights. ESDP structures can be also used proactively even by smaller countries. Sweden, for instance, has used the new institutions to re-shape the country's strategic doctrine by exporting its strong preferences for a multi-lateral rule-based order to the EU level and importing notions of using military force for humanitarian purposes as well as watering down its neutrality attachment within a new European defence policy framework.
Mediatised Crises as Impetus to Societal Learning: Western Interventions from Bosnia to Iraq
Threat perceptions and institutional socialisation do not usually bring about changes over the short term as societies respond rather slowly to changes in strategic thinking at the elite level.
While elites can engage in moral advocacy they are under normal circumstances not able to single-handedly transform collectively held strategic norms. Yet, changes in national strategic cultures as well as the norms and narratives underpinning them can and do occur, either very gradually to the forces described above or more rapidly through events and crises, which act as 'formative moments' (Ringmar 1996 , p. 85, Heiselberg 2003 for the revision and reinterpretation of collective memory and beliefs. Existing cognitive schemata can be challenged either through a constant stream of similar, or a repetition of the same kind of discrepant information, or it can occur through the accumulated, high intensity exposure to such information. The direct experience of war can be one of the strongest causes of societal learning. It has the potential to challenge in fundamental ways deeply ingrained collective beliefs and identities (Hondrich 1992) . Lessons learnt from violent conflict within and between states can run very deep in societies, especially when considering the effects of shattering defeats rather than those of dramatic victories as the examples of Japanese and German societies amply illustrate (Katzenstein 1996b , Hondrich 1992 ). The question is whether crises learning can also occur in cases where societies are not directly affected by attacks. In order to effectively challenge societal strategic norms without the direct experience of warfare, humanitarian and security crises need to be publicised and framed appropriately by the news media to overcome public awareness thresholds and to create empathy for the victims of such violence. This kind of mechanism can be called mediatised crises learning and can affect all four of the strategic norms outlined in the previous section.
After the end of the cold war, European societies and governments were confronted with new kinds of violent conflicts and crises. As frozen conflicts began to thaw in the absence of the disciplining effect of superpower rivalry, war did not come to an end, but suddenly took place on a smaller scale elsewhere, including the EU's immediate neighbourhood. West European societies were largely unprepared not only to the fact that interethnic violence, mass rape and concentration camps could take place in their backyard, but were also shocked by the level and immediacy of exposure to pictures of shelling, barbed wire fences, and gruelling accounts of rape victims. This raised painful memories in many European countries of Nazi 
Combined Trends of Normative Convergence and their Implications
The previous section looked at the impact of three learning mechanisms on strategic norms and specified, which type(s) of the four norms would be most affected and in what way. What has been missing is a combined assessment of these changes in the light of the convergence thesis. This final section aims to do that by advancing four hypotheses about the extent and direction of the convergence process, which will need to be validated by further longitudinal and comparative research. The appropriate methodology will vary with the different learning mechanism, for instance, public discourse analysis and surveys for analysing mediatised crisis learning, participant observation and qualitative interviews for institutional socialisation, and self-report questionnaires backed up by interviews and surveys for the analysis of changing threat perceptions. (Carstens 2004 ). Whether such failures are an indication of persistent differences in strategic norms or whether they will lead to learning beyond expert circles is unclear.
Effects on the Authorisation of Force: Solidifying Consensus on Multilateralism and
International Law: Changes in threat perceptions after the cold war and the effects of mediatised crisis learning have solidified the consensus on the thresholds for international authorisation, either through international law or the United Nations Security Council. This can be partly seen as a counterbalancing of the extended interpretation of norms regarding humanitarian intervention and steps taken by some countries to lower their domestic thresholds to allow for out-of-area missions in the first place. With regard to the domestic authorisation of the use force, a genuine process of convergence from both ends of the scale seems to be under way as constitutional caveats concerning the use of force are being lowered in some countries, while those states with very low thresholds (commander-in-chief model) move towards a greater oversight role for parliaments. There is also discernible pressure from some elite actors to strengthen European level accountability mechanisms, especially the powers of the European Parliament to scrutinise the High Representative.
Effects on the Preferred Mode of Defence Cooperation: Fading Attachment to
Neutrality as well as to NATO. The decline of the Soviet threat has weakened European societies' attachment to neutrality as well as to defence cooperation through the US/NATO.
While substantial ideational differences over this issue remain at the elite level, a considerable alienation from the US as the only or preferred ally has set in at the societal level. The common meeting ground for these opposing trends is the growing support for the European Union as an actors in security and defence matters, which has been brought about through the combined impact of institutional socialisation and the negative experience of European influence on US decision-making and action in the cases of Kosovo and Iraq. Moreover, European defence cooperation provides neutral countries such as Sweden and Finland with a normatively accepted outlet for pursuing the defence of values outside the framework of a military alliance. One would expect the process of destabilisation and re-framing of neutrality norms to extend eventually also to those countries such as Austria and Ireland, where neutrality is firmly embedded in national identity narratives.
These four hypotheses of outcomes are clearly preliminary until more comprehensive and detailed empirical data regarding processes of normative changes becomes available. Yet, if the causal mechanism and their effects can be confirmed, the contribution to the convergence debate is clear. Normative convergence is most notable in the de-prioritisation of territorial defence, the legitimacy of intervention for humanitarian ends, international authorisation by the UN, and a growing attachment to the EU as the appropriate framework for defence cooperation. Differences remain in the area of using force abroad to pre-empt security threats to the home territory, attachment to the US/NATO context, and, most notably, the acceptability of casualties arising from the way in which force is used. The second important finding is that normative convergence affects particularly but not only the more pacific, neutral or defensive strategic cultures. British and French strategic cultures are also under adaptation pressure with regard to the preferred mode of cooperation through crisis learning, the demise of the Soviet threat, and to a lesser degree institutional socialisation. Convergence is thus not simply the process of approximating the British or the French strategic mind-set, but a process of hybridisation of strategic cultures, a gradual ironing out of differences.
The implications for ESDP and its ideational framework the European Security Strategy are both positive and negative. They are positive in so far as the overall drive towards closer European cooperation in defence matters enjoys broad societal support and at the elite level there has been an easing of principled concerns particularly in the new member states over using the EU as an important if not preferred framework for security cooperation. In addition, learning mechanisms have solidified a broad commitment to a strong role for the UN and multilateralism as well as an emphasis on wielding non-military means more effectively. The normative foundations for the pre-emptive use of force seem still fragile, as does the basis for a common approach to the way in which force is used if the risk of casualties is high.
Especially, the last factor remains the Achilles heel of the ESDP and would require additional learning at the level of military organisations and national publics. This kind of learning could only arise from experiences with missions of national troops in hostile settings, most notably in Bosnia, Kosovo or Afghanistan. In sum, there is much reason for the EU and individual states to be very careful about the missions and goals they want to undertake in order to avoid the risk of political fall-out and public backlash. Erring on the side of caution may be difficult in the face of strong public calls for action and the dynamism of unfolding events, but it may be crucial for building up confidence that the EU can be effective once it decides to act.
